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MONEY AND SOCIALITY IN SOUTH AFRICA’S
INFORMAL ECONOMY
David Neves and Andries du Toit
ECONOMIC INFORMALITY IN SOUTH AFRICA
This article examines the social dimensions of money in South Africa’s informal
economy by considering the interplay of agency, culture and context. Focusing on
survivalist self-employment and impoverished livelihoods, the article aligns itself
with socio-culturalist analysis (cf. van Donge 1992) of economic action, in order
to examine the imperatives and networks that underpin practices of generating,
accumulating and managing wealth at the margins of the economy, within the
post-apartheid distributional regime.
Since it was ﬁrst named by Hart (1973) almost four decades ago, the informal
sector has been a longstanding domain of interest across an array of disciplines.
Defying early predictions that it would be eclipsed or simply absorbed by the
formal economy, the informal sector has continued to grow globally. As state-
based economic governance has waned in the neo-liberal era, informality is
increasingly evident in the global growth of outsourcing, casualization and
industrial outworking (Chen 2007). Economic informality therefore appears to be
less a residue of underdevelopment than a means by which a growing number of
markets, economic activities and working lives are organized. In South Africa,
those who work in the informal sector are marked by disadvantage. Almost 90 per
cent of those in the sector are African (Devey et al. 2006), and relative to formal
sector employees they are disproportionately female, and generally poor with very
low average incomes (Rogerson 2007). Whereas in most developing societies
the informal sector is the default option for workers unable to secure formal
employment, in South Africa it is comparatively small and accounts for only a
ﬁfth of the workforce (Cichello et al. 2005). Despite widespread poverty and
unemployment South Africa paradoxically has a lower proportion of informal
employment than any comparable developing country (Foxcroft et al. 2002). The
legacy of apartheid, which inhibited trade by Africans, sees the combination of a
strong, formal economy in a developing country context, which serves to crowd
out informal economic opportunities (Lund and Skinner 2003; Philip 2009).
These gaps in informal sector activity are reﬂected in a paucity of research on
those enterprises that do exist. The sector tends to be viewed in homogeneous and
undifferentiated terms, misrecognized and misunderstood because of normative
notions of economic ‘rationality’, or found wanting when measured with the
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yardstick of ‘entrepreneurism’ predicated on rational, self-interested, utility-
maximising individuals. Informal sector workers are prone to not keeping written
business records, eliding enterprise and domestic accounts, and extracting
seemingly unsustainably high levels of resources from their enterprises. They are
motivated not by business plans but by various social and redistributional logics.
Hence, in an inﬂuential comparative study within the business and management
sciences literature, South Africa’s impoverished (predominantly African female)
informal sector workers are deemed to be innately lacking an ‘entrepreneurial
mindset’ (Maas and Herrington 2006).
Although the informal sector is markedly larger elsewhere on the continent, it is
viewed in similarly ambivalent terms. Attributions of cultural inadequacy are a
common trope in accounts of African practices of economic informality.
Narratives of the patrimonialism, clientelism, criminality and violence associated
with accumulation (Bayart 1993; Fukuyama 1995; Bayart et al. 1999) routinely
ascribe these to African cultural propensities and repertoires. Yet the enduring
question remains, how precisely should the relationship between the social and
economic realms be conceptualized?
Alternate modes of analysis, which avoid invoking the homo economicus of
much conventional analysis, are less damning of sociality. They draw attention to
the key role played by market actors (Granovetter 1985; 2005; Granovetter and
Swedberg 2001), and to social networks and institutional dimensions (Beckert
2007). Institutions, governance and regulation serve to stabilize markets:
expectations are seen as formed by the cultural, institutional and structural
rootedness of market exchanges. These extra-economic factors include cultural
mores, ‘social networks and horizons of meaning within which market actors
meet’ (ibid.: 6–7). In this way, networks of trust and morality constituted within
the socio-cultural environment enable economic production, distribution and
consumption by stabilizing the social contingency inherent in exchange. They are
present in all markets, but all the more signiﬁcant in contexts where formal
market institutions are absent or weak (ibid.).
This article draws on a socio-culturalist approach in order to re-examine some
of the assumptions related to academic and popular usage of ‘informality’,
particularly in the South African context. This approach argues that practices of
accumulation are shaped by people’s experiences and interpretations of social
behaviour, rather than impersonal market logic (van Donge 1992; Beuving
and Beuving 2004). Finally, economic informality seldom involves the absence
of regulatory frameworks or institutions; instead, regulation takes place
through popular institutions and networks, often beyond the ambit of the state
(Meagher 2009).
METHOD AND APPROACH
In order to understand how informal self-employment is embedded in social
networks, it is essential to capture dynamics of both household and enterprise:
matters often separated or seen as the domain of divergent academic disciplines,
theoretical perspectives and methodologies (du Toit and Neves 2007). Analysing
the connections between them is important in order to capture their interaction:
for example, the use of residential spaces for work, the use of unpaid kin, and the
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practice of extracting signiﬁcant resources from enterprises for household use
(‘off-take’).
The research project involved qualitative ﬁeldwork in 2007 (ibid.), repeated
(with the addition of several new cases) in 2009. Research was conducted in
over 20 households, evenly divided between the African urban township of
Khayelitsha in the Western Cape and a rural village in the rural Eastern Cape, in
one of South Africa’s spatially extended internal migratory routes. During
multiple ﬁeld visits, ethnographic interviews and observational research were
undertaken into enterprises outside the regulatory net of taxation, occupational
health and safety, and employment, zoning and trading regulations. Most were
well-established, having run for a number of years. The National Small Business
Act (1996 and amended 2004) designates a micro-enterprise in wholesale trade,
catering and accommodation as one with fewer than ﬁve employees, a turnover
below R200,000, and gross assets below R100,000 (RSA 2003); all the cases
studied were well below this threshold. The cases were sampled to get a diversity
of units by common enterprise types and enterprise operator demographics (such
as age and gender). Research interactions with the enterprise operator focused on
understanding self-employment activities and issues related to the enterprise,
including history, structure, assets, employment, interaction with suppliers, access
to credit and ﬁnancial intermediation, and relationships with customers and with
wider aspects of infrastructure and governance. Discussions with members of
their corresponding households sought to understand – over time, and with visits
in 2007 and later in 2009 – the history, composition and modes of livelihood
involved, and to explore the nature of hidden transfers between the household and
the enterprise.
Finally, in departure from the conventional anthropological practice of
exegesis of a small number of case studies in their speciﬁc context, a relatively
larger number of case study vignettes are presented and discussed in this
article.
THE POLITICAL AND RELATIONAL ECONOMY OF INFORMALITY
Economic opportunity in contemporary South African society has been strongly
patterned and shaped by the colonial and apartheid legacies of racialized
underdevelopment. Three key legacies have been noted (Philip 2009): ﬁrst, the
centralized, vertically integrated monopoly structure of the core economy, with its
highly skewed distribution of assets and capital; second, the racialized spatial
legacy of township and homelands located far from economic opportunity; and
third, the enduring legacy of inequality in the acquisition of skills and education.
All of these contribute to a post-apartheid distributional regime marked by
enduring poverty and some of the highest levels of income inequality in the world
(Seekings and Nattrass 2006). These features are manifested differently in the
two research settings. In the rural context of the Eastern Cape, the decline of
remittances from migrant industrial labour, a century of state antipathy to
smallholder agriculture, and the dissipation of the social arrangements which
historically facilitated agriculture (Andrews and Fox 2004) intensify the process
of de-agarianization evident across the continent (cf. Bryceson and Jamal 1997).
Many households are both spatially ‘stretched’ between the urban Western and
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rural Eastern Cape and united by oscillatory migration (Spiegel 1996), yet
prospects for urban employment are constrained by lack of skills in the
workforce, steady post-Fordist decline in the resource extraction and manufac-
turing sectors, and the apartheid-era spatial legacy. De-industrialization in turn
prevents people from reinvesting whatever urban earnings they have in rural
livelihoods, and this exacerbates the decline of land-based livelihoods. South
Africa is therefore a highly monetized context where formal employment
opportunities have dissipated, and where millions have been adversely incorpor-
ated into the broader political economy (du Toit and Neves 2007). In this context,
key to survival are state cash transfers, practices of social mutuality and
reciprocity (or ‘informal social protection’, see Bracking and Sachikonye 2006)
and endless repertoires of ‘survivalist improvisation’ (Davis 2006), including
informal economic activity. The discussion that follows examines the latter.
The sociality of objectives
Daily survival rather than accumulation predominated in many informants’
accounts of their motivations at these low levels of income. Yet despite this, as the
two cases to follow indicate, there are often disparate and complex objectives to
which informal economic activity is orientated. In some instances, as in the case
study vignette presented below, impoverished people are able to develop longer-
term ﬁnancial goals, beyond immediate survival.
Sibongile was a middle-aged woman who was running a spaza, take-away food and
liquor store from her large sprawling township shack. She had run the business since her
arrival in urban Khayelitsha outside Cape Town, when it was ﬁrst settled. She learnt to
trade with her husband, from whom she subsequently separated in the 1980s. However
she continued to sell liquor on his behalf from her shop, despite the fact that he was
resident elsewhere. Well-positioned relative to several local schools, the business made as
much as R2,000 per week, and she had put several adult children through tertiary
education and into the middle-class professions of teaching and nursing. A distant
relative was working in the shop, but she maintained that he was not being ‘paid’. The
stipend she gave him weekly she called ‘pocket money’. There were high levels of
off-take: the household ‘eats from the spaza shop’ she explained. In 2007 she insisted the
property was hers, but by 2009, amidst the formalization of tenure associated with
redevelopment (subsidized housing provision) in the township, she and her husband
ﬁnally concluded a divorce and she lost her old shack and shop. She was building a house
and shop on an adjacent plot, using some of the money she had been saving to enlarge
the previous premises. In 2007 she was openly selling alcohol, but by 2009, in a context of
heightened law enforcement, carried less stock and sold it more surreptitiously. Sibongile
also described how she gave very little credit (after losing large amounts to bad debt),
but extended some to the local teachers a week or so in advance of their payday, in
anticipation of reliable repayment.
Although there was an uneven ability to quantify proﬁtability, many
informants, especially food retailers like Sibongile, extracted relatively high levels
of resources (‘off-take’), in the form of food, from their enterprises. Monetary
gain was in these cases subordinated to this important off-take. The fungibility of
money, and the ease with which it can be converted into various commodities,
disguises the fact that although generating income and improving food security
can overlap, they are subtly different objectives. In Sibongile’s case, she managed
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to develop a long-term view of objectives, enabling her to educate her
children into middle-class vocations. She aimed thereby to transcend the need of
household members to work in the survivalist informal sector.
Objectives were sometimes even more complex and diffuse, as the next
example, detailed below, suggests.
Magalama is a retired domestic worker, who sold bottles of Coca-Cola from her
comfortable rural homestead. Morbidly obese and unable to walk far, she was unusual in
our sample in that she effectively constituted a one-person household, although her
urban-resident sons sent remittances. Throughout the course of the research Magalama
hired a succession of caregivers and her accrued savings, state old-age grant, and
the electriﬁcation of the village enabled her to acquire a refrigerator required to sell
‘cooldrink’. This activity was perhaps most remarkable for the fact that it persisted over
several years, despite its small scale. Magalama routinely sold a single case (12 bottles) a
month, yielding a diminutive proﬁt equivalent to no more than 5 per cent of her state
pension. She continued to engage with it because it elicited a trickle of visitors and drew
her into the social networks of a village where she was not well established. Similarly,
she hired the labour necessary to engage in petty agricultural production (which on our
calculation was merely breaking even) because, she said, ‘it is our tradition’. However, it
became apparent that offering the villagers casual employment (with payment in cash or
in kind) was being used to channel their requests for material assistance, thereby
deﬂecting redistributive claims and preserving her pension income.
In the above case study vignette, Magalama generated little income from
vending – but this activity served to keep an otherwise mobility-impaired and
isolated elderly woman, with weak links to the community, socially engaged.
Having arrived in the village only on her retirement, Magalama was a relative
outsider. Her marginality was compounded by her physical immobility, which
imposed constraints on interacting with others and building social networks.
Against this backdrop Magalama’s soft drink vending assured her of the
occasional visitor, cemented her place in social networks and integrated her into
the relational life of the village. Although a poorly remunerated activity, it
enabled her to enact appropriate forms of dignity, propriety and the sociality that
Nyamnjoh (2002) terms ‘conviviality’. This provided an opportunity for her
potentially to mitigate some of the suspicion or even hostility she – as a socially
atomized, elderly woman without locally resident male kin –might otherwise
elicit within her village context. Financial gain was therefore not her primary
consideration; instead, Magalama’s activities were an instrumental part of her
efforts to maintain her social respectability within the community.
Even amongst the small number of case study vignettes examined, informal
economic activity was directed to a wide range of objectives: generating income,
bolstering food security, facilitating social connectedness, slowing the draw-down
of a ﬁnite portfolio of assets.
The neo-classical economic logic of maximizing proﬁt and minimizing costs
inadequately captures the potentially multiple objectives of economic informality;
more variegated formulations better attuned to the socially embedded consider-
ations which underpin informal economic activity are needed. To this end several
writers (du Toit and Neves 2007; Petersen and Charman 2008; von Broembsen
2008) have suggested that informal economic activity be understood not only as
productive and income-generating, but as a reproductive activity orientated to
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sustaining household survival. The divergent objectives to which economic
informality is directed, the porous boundaries between the domestic and
enterprise realms, the persistence of household-level production and subsistence
activities: all suggest that despite the predominance of the formal market in South
Africa, patterns of micro-accumulation at the margins are incompletely capitalist
in character, and may even have continuities with earlier pre-capitalist modes.
These patterns of accumulation also contradict commonplace, evolutionary
assumptions about the growth of markets and linear progression of economic
development (cf. Ferguson 1999; Humphrey 2002).
Sociality and economic governance
Informal economic activity and the conditions under which it occurs are
inextricably bound up with regulation and governance. While much scholarship
is concerned with state-based regulation, increasingly the importance of informal,
non-state governance of informal economic activity has been emphasized
(Roitman 2005; Meagher 2010). Although both varieties are considered here, it
is within informal non-state governance that social networks play a particularly
prominent role. Regimes of governance are contextually rooted and spatially
patterned; in this inquiry they take on different forms at the urban and rural sites.
A signiﬁcant difference in formal governance between the rural Eastern Cape
and urban Cape Town is the institution of the hereditary chieftaincy. In South
Africa’s bifurcated regimes of governance and citizenship, urban residents are the
‘citizens’ of civic authority while the rural residents in the communal area of the
former homelands are the partial ‘subjects’ of hereditary traditional authority
(Mamdani 1996). Chiefs dispense (often uneven) rural governance and exercise
much of their authority in relation to local land administration and the
adjudication of disputes. Many of the self-employed in our rural ﬁeldsite, such
as taxi operators, derive their right to trade from communal recognition, and local
residence in a particular locale. Rural taxi operator Nselo, described below, was
one such person.
Nselo was a man in his ﬁfties who ran a passenger taxi (based on a pick-up truck and
known as a quqa) from his rural Eastern Cape village. The pick-up carried ten tightly
squeezed passengers seated on wooden benches in its load bed under a ﬁbreglass canopy,
and operated on a route traversing twenty-odd kilometres of unpaved roads to the local
town. In 2007 he owned a quqa, a second pick-up for carrying goods, and a third that had
been wrecked by an errant driver. Nselo occupied a comfortable rural homestead, his
parents had been members of the petty rural elite, and he had a relatively favourable and
long history of formal-sector urban employment. It was during this period that he
acquired a township house and a Sotho wife from the industrial heartland of Gauteng.
Through this urban employment and the beneﬁcence of local (schoolteacher) elite kin,
Nselo gained the literacy, capital and driving skills to run his business. Although he
owned an uncharacteristic range of ﬁnancial products (including a small endowment),
he lamented the low proﬁtability of the enterprise and eagerly sought microﬁnance
from the researchers. By 2009 he had disposed of two of the vehicles and continued
to ply his trade with failing eyesight and increasingly unfavourable attention from
the local trafﬁc authorities. He continued to lament his low proﬁtability and high
maintenance costs. An absence of provisioning to replace his vehicle suggested the
income it earned was merely a way of cushioning the inexorable draw-down of his formal
sector savings.
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With his connections to the village elite, Nselo epitomized the local residence
and association membership required to successfully operate a quqa. He explained
that for a new entrant to engage in the same enterprise he would have to be a part
of the village, by securing a homestead site via the local headman. Furthermore
running a quqa requires membership of the local ‘taxi van’ association, with its
attendant ‘joining fee’ and its prescribed ﬁxed route between the village and town.
Although the association is voluntary and lacks statutory underpinning, Nselo
thought it inconceivable, if not provocative, that a non-member would attempt to
run a quqa. Regimes of informal governance are potentially almost as variegated
as the formal: unlike his passenger-carrying quqa,Nselo’s goods-carrying pick-up
truck neither travelled a ﬁxed route nor offered a service limited to his own
village. The two vehicles constituted different enterprises, were subject to different
conditions and necessitated membership of two voluntary associations.
The variegated nature of authority and governance is further illustrated by the
case study vignette below.
Cynthia, a hairdresser in her mid-thirties, and her sister ran two ‘hair saloons’ at the
Khayelitsha taxi rank, operating from converted steel shipping containers which they
purchased ﬁve years after arriving from Zimbabwe, having left that country as economic
conditions deteriorated. Cynthia and her sister had formal hair dressing qualiﬁcations,
which she thought distinguished them from many of their local competitors. Cynthia
sent regular remittances to their family and their father was temporarily resident with her
as he sought medical treatment in Cape Town. She closed the containers during a bout of
xenophobic violence in 2008, and readily explained they would one day like to return to
Zimbabwe. Cynthia was seeking to position herself as a wholesaler of a range of ‘ethnic’
(sic) haircare products. She paid a small weekly ‘sweeping fee’ to the local taxi
association, which, she explained, deterred criminals.
In the urban townships forms of informal civic authority were also evident and
took on particular local forms. Accounts of street committees were prominent in
people’s recollections of how they had originally been allocated trading sites. The
role of street committees had been reanimated with the ongoing upgrading of the
area. In addition, those working in close proximity to the taxi rank indicated that
they were able to appeal to the ofﬁces of the local (minibus) taxi association if they
had a dispute with a debtor or employee, suggesting that the governing powers of
such associations extend beyond the immediate remit of their own business
interests. Many informants, such as hairdresser Cynthia, reported that they paid
the ‘sweeping fee’ to the local taxi association. It was clear that the local taxi
association was widely regarded as a source of governance and a buttress against
unsanctioned claims in the form of criminal victimization. In a context marked by
high levels of informality the local taxi association thus represents an important
vector of local governance. The rank, located on municipal land and nominally
overseen by the municipality, is effectively controlled by the taxi association. The
association’s authority has a spatial dimension; it radiates outwards from their
ofﬁces at the taxi rank, being robust at the centre but dissipating for enterprises
situated further away. The township can be conceptualized as consisting of a
number of overlapping, concentric rings of authority and governance.
These are situations of informal economic governance in which enforcement
through violence or the threat of violence is central, and where the state is far from
assured of a monopoly on such violence. An ofﬁcial government inquiry into the
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taxi industry in the Western Cape found the taxi associations operate ‘like a
modern day maﬁa with the power to extort monies from operators, the ability to
kill people who disagree with them and threaten their interests’ (Western Cape
Provincial Government 2005: 111). The inquiry report is replete with accounts of
the use of covert iimbovane (‘ants’, or assassination squads) to murder rivals and
the amassing of vast unaccounted-for ‘war chests’, secretly used to ‘hire hit men,
buy illegal ﬁrearms, employ the services of traditional healers, pay for legal fees,
bail for those arrested, pay families of iimbovane and maintain the services of
those involved in violence’ (ibid.: 98; see also Dugard 2000). Informality and
violence are frequently responses to regulatory retreat and the legacy of enduring
economic disadvantage (Meagher 2009). In the context of the taxi industry, even
the ofﬁcial inquiry readily identiﬁes how a regulatory vacuum provides the
conditions for violence (Western Cape Provincial Government 2005).
Informality, the social networks which shape it, and the often violent associ-
ations which police it, nonetheless intersect with practices of formal governance.
Both the rural and urban ﬁeldsites were subject to regimes of formal regulation
associated with the South African state, including environmental health regu-
lations (for food retail), land-use planning (zoning), and regulations controlling
matters as diverse as liquor consumption and sale, and road trafﬁc. This state-led
regulation coexists uneasily with non-state forms of governance. It also has
different manifestations and intensities of enforcement in different locales, with
state and formal regulation relatively scanty in the rural area, but more present
(albeit unevenly) in the urban locale. In the case of Nselo’s rural taxi, the drivers
of vehicles who carry passengers for gain are required to hold a Public Drivers
Permit (PDP) in addition to their regular driver’s licence. However while national
trafﬁc regulations permit the transportation of passengers in the load bed of a
truck, they may not be carried in the load bed for gain, as fare-paying passengers.1
Yet in practice these formal regulations were accommodated to the reality of
the ubiquitous quqa taxis. Trafﬁc authorities routinely overlook the statutory
prohibition against carrying passengers in open trucks for gain, yet enforce the
requirement for the PDP. A local trafﬁc enforcement authority readily conceded
that pick-up truck taxis were unsafe but attributed parochial tolerance of them to
the fact that local residents were ‘poor’ and could not afford a more suitable mode
of transport. It was tacitly understood that the vehicles would travel only between
the rural villages and local town, rather than the ‘white’ town outside the former
homeland and about 100 kilometres away. To do the latter would incur, by way of
punishment, an invocation of the overlooked rule and certain legal sanction.
Regimes of governance are therefore contextual, variegated and spatialized in
terms that are typically widely understood by both enforcers and enforced-
against.
This nested and hybrid combination of formal and informal, in relation to the
taxi and quqa regulation, disrupts any sense of a sharp binary between informal
and formal, sanctioned and unsanctioned, from socially embedded to disem-
bedded (Polanyi 1957). Instead it recalls Guyer’s (2004) notion of patchwork
‘formalisms’. Comparable syncretism is evident in accounts of the ‘mixed
1Regulation 247 of the National Road Trafﬁc Act merely speciﬁes a minimum height of the
sides of the goods area of a truck in which passengers are carried.
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embeddedness’ of informal emigrant enterprises in the Netherlands (Kloosterman
et al. 1999), which are constituted within the twin contexts of communal and
social networks, on the one hand, and overarching relationships to the state and
formal economy on the other. Informal economic activity in South Africa is
likewise undertaken in the interstices of a powerful formal economy and a state
that is far from ‘hollowed out’.
The sociality of trading
The social demands of trading are illustrated in the story of Neliswa, a tailor in
Khayelitsha.
Middle-aged widow Neliswa sewed traditional ‘German print’ for the traditional
matrimonial market, and sold her wares from a stall at a taxi rank in Khayelitsha.
Alongside her sewing she also engaged in Zionist-Pentecostal healing from her
Khayelitsha shack for ‘donations’, and sold shoes in a more distant township. Neliswa
started selling clothes from her home in the rural Eastern Cape after the death of her
husband over two decades previously, using his formal workplace pension as capital. In
the 1990s she came to Cape Town, lived with her sister and continued sourcing and
selling clothes and footwear from distant Durban while schooling her children. It was at
this time that she completed a sewing course and started making the traditional wear,
which is not subject to the same Asian competition as other garments. By 2007 she also
carried a large book containing the records of debts owed to her (about R4,000) for shoes
sold in a distant Cape Town township. She favoured the distant site because it was easier
to collect debt where she was unknown, as people ‘don’t come with stories’. Neliswa was
relatively unusual in having a paid, non-kin employee working at this site while she
sewed from her home. She attributed the lack of crime to the local taxi association, which
deterred criminals and was also able to adjudicate local disputes.
The related activities of conducting trade and managing money can evoke
signiﬁcant innovations and acts of accommodation, while also revealing
contradictions. Especially demanding is the need to manage socially redistributive
claims and networks, keeping them at bay while nonetheless engaging with them.
This variously required disembedding (Neliswa’s selling shoes to strangers rather
than neighbours), deﬂecting claims with alternative activities (in the earlier
example of Magalama’s agricultural labour), or mustering the authority and force
to meet coercive redistributive claims. So powerful are such redistributive claims
that fear of crime is cited as a reason for reluctance to engage in self-employment
(Cichello 2005). On the other hand, the need to maintain a client base and the
demands of sociality require that such social networks be sustained.
The task of trading in the informal sector entails the juggling not only of
different social imperatives but also of enterprise considerations such as the
setting of prices. In both ﬁeldsites, prices, especially for standard mass-produced
goods, were often uniform. There appeared to be a widespread reluctance to
engage in price competition, and many informants stated that they refuse to
consider competing on price. Petersen and Charman (2008) document how
informal sector vendors scrupulously avoid discounting, but instead compete in
terms of factors which are not (directly) price-related. Engaging in ‘covert
competitiveness’, such vendors instead seek to secure favourable spatial locations
or attractive supplier discounts, or build good relationships with customers.
Indeed, traders such as Neliswa routinely engaged in hearty and good-natured
139MONEY, SOCIALITY, AND THE INFORMAL ECONOMY
banter with customers, which they understood to be part of their sales strategy
and competitive advantage. When questioned on their competitive strategies,
traders were frequently vague and coy to a degree that cannot merely be ascribed
to proprietorial secrecy. They often attributed their success to luck.
That social opprobrium against price competition was a signiﬁcant factor
discouraging traders from practising it is illustrated by an example of its violation.
Xenophobic violence against Somali township traders in 2008 was largely
attributed to their superior retail prowess and the inroads they made into local
spaza shop trade. Organized and experienced Somali traders routinely undercut
local spaza shops, with a report commissioned by local government claiming that
the tensions that exist between foreign and local spaza shop owners are due to the fact
that the spaza shop market is becoming increasingly competitive often resulting in local
spaza shop owners not being able to compete effectively with foreign spaza shop owners
in terms of price and changing customer preferences. (KLS/CCT 2009: 46)
Xenophobia is undoubtedly a complex phenomenon with multiple causes and
long antecedents, but it is clear that by successfully engaging in overt price-based
competition, the Somali traders violated prevailing retail practices and local
repertoires for the creation and capture of value. These practices elicited extreme
antipathy from existing traders. The force of the tacit prohibition against price
competition cannot simply be understood as anti-competitive collusive behav-
iour. Instead, sociality is invoked to contain the moral disorder of money.
It guards against the conﬂict, jealousy and social disruption associated with
accumulation, in a resource-poor context, with deeply rooted (albeit highly
contradictory) ideologies of social reciprocity and communalism.
The sociality of money: debt and credit
The demands of managing money, debt and credit are key tasks in the context of
economic informality (Hart 1973; Roitman 2003). The informal sector in South
Africa is tightly intertwined with formal sector value and commodity chains.
With the single exception of traditional medicinal herbs, virtually all products
retailed or manufactured in the informal sector derive directly from suppliers of
products or raw materials in the formal economy (Skinner 2006). South Africa
has long been subject to the forces of commodiﬁcation and monetization, and the
prospects for independent subsistence production have long since waned (Wolpe
1972). In the urban and rural ﬁeldsites, these conditions also reﬂect the linkages of
informal enterprises to the formal labour market in the form of wages, workplace
pension, and provident or retrenchment packages.2 Informal enterprises were
intertwined with formal sector cash inputs. The linkages between the formal and
informal sector include not only the leveraging of resources derived from the
formal sector into informal enterprises, but also an extensive interaction between
formal and informal sector employment (Devey et al. 2006). In the case studies,
the few cases that did not have such labour market linkages had enjoyed other
distinctive strengths such as the early acquisition of particularly favourable
2Even comparatively generous (by developing country standards) social grants represented a
variety of ‘formal’ income.
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trading sites. In general terms, however, successful, sustained trade required
linkages to the formal sector.
Credit constraints have been identiﬁed as a hindrance to self-employment
elsewhere in the literature (Cichello 2005), but the empirical ﬁndings suggest that
this is a complex issue. While some informants readily described themselves as
needing money or credit such as microﬁnance, others resisted this idea. For
example, Sibongile was vocal in her criticism of what she felt were extortionate
interest rates. Doubting her ability to repay microﬁnance, she turned it down. In
anticipation of the expansion of her business in 2007 she had saved a considerable
part of the requisite R30,000. By 2009 she had diverted this sum into the
construction of a new spaza shop and house, after her ex-husband had reclaimed
her previous premises following their divorce. Furthermore, with informants’
expectations cued by popular and ofﬁcial discourses of microﬁnance, what might
appear to be a credit constraint may reﬂect the harder realities of low proﬁtability.
Enquiries about the credit took place in a national and international context
where microcredit was regularly touted as an appropriate policy response to the
problems faced by the SMME (Small, Medium and Micro Enterprise) sector.
It was therefore unclear how far informants’ desire for microﬁnance was being
reﬂexively shaped by its discursive popularity and relative availability. Hence
Nselo’s claim that he needed credit to ﬁx a wrecked vehicle in 2007 was undercut
by the fact that he held an uncharacteristically diverse range of formal ﬁnancial
products, and yet, despite having access to such products, subsequently sold off
the unproductive vehicle rather than mending it.
Apart from difﬁculties in securing credit, a key factor in running an informal
sector enterprise is the task of dealing with the pervasive demands for credit, in a
resource-poor setting where impoverished Africans typically rely on a vast and
complex range of ﬁnancial instruments. Detailed research amongst this group,
based on the keeping of ﬁnancial diaries, documented an average of eleven credit
‘instruments’, most of which were informal (Collins 2005; Collins et al. 2009).
Those in the informal sector responded to these demands in ways as complex as
those deployed in the management of redistributive claims described earlier.
Some, such as Sibongile, strenuously resisted granting credit, while others, like
Neliswa, acquiesced, but maintained written records, and strategically sold her
wares in areas where she was not resident, arguing that people would be more
inclined to pay their debt if she was socially distant. Radebe, whose narrative
follows, engaged in elaborate procedures for vetting potential debtors by
getting his employees to record debtors’ cell phone numbers, establish their
employment status and visit their residential addresses. In these cases, the
management of customer demand for credit entailed one of two broad strategies.
The ﬁrst involved deﬂecting and resisting demands, including using strategies to
avoid claims of social entitlement with their attendant risk of non-payment.
The second involved building the kinds of sociality and ‘weak links’ (Granovetter
1985), networks, social surveillance and pressure required to successfully
collect debt.
Similar efforts to manage social claims loomed large in accounts of saving. For
many the key imperative with saving is the need to organize cash ﬂows and
smooth consumption: an objective which often predominates over tactics such as
building assets or gaining favourable interest rates (Collins et al. 2009). The
literature is replete with practices such as borrowing frommicroﬁnance projects in
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order to save informally, or charging an increment for the daily collection of small
deposits instead of paying the interest of formal banks (ibid.). In our ﬁeldsites,
savings practices were tightly interwoven with social networks and practices,
especially through the widespread use of informal Rotating Savings and Credit
Associations (ROSCAs) or ﬁnancial mutuals: amacalelo in isiXhosa (see Bähre
2007). Informants with more to save often hedged their risk by belonging to more
than one such assocation. In these cases the sociality and risk mitigation gains
obtained by participation in multiple ROSCAs trumped the increased effort and
transaction costs involved. Research shows how impoverished Africans’ access to
new income streams associated with the receipt of a social grant results in a
slightly higher uptake in formal debt, but these recipients generally continue
to maintain a portfolio of formal and informal ﬁnancial instruments (Neves
et al. 2009).
A ﬁnal point underscoring the social dimensions of saving and accruing value is
that many forms of wealth, such as household labour capacity or communally
owned land, are not readily commensurate with or convertible to money. Social
logics dictate that cattle may be converted into an abstracted monetary ‘sphere of
exchange’ only reluctantly (Ferguson 1992), or sold by entrepreneurs keen to
acquire trading stores only with great circumspection (Bank 1997). Owners of
such stores of wealth walk a social tightrope between engaging with new
opportunities of accumulation and remaining committed to a communalistic
range of social meanings and obligations. In this way they seek to ensure that
short-term ﬁscal gains will not come at the cost of disrupting the moral and social
underpinnings of longer-term ‘transactional orders’ (Bloch and Parry 1999).
Formalization and sociality
This ﬁnal section explores the place of sociality against the backdrop of ongoing
processes of economic formalization. An inﬂuential argument is that those in the
informal sector are constrained through having to transact within their social
networks and to rely on relational systems of interpersonal guarantee.
Accordingly contemporary policy injunctions argue for access to formal services,
entitlements and protections (de Soto 2000). Formality promises access to systems
of legal redress, secure tenure, protection from hazards, and access to
infrastructure, opportunities and markets. However, formality can constitute a
threat to social networks and patterns of sociality, rendering its beneﬁts
equivocal. The potentially deleterious consequences of formality were evident in
the case study vignettes of mechanic Zikhode and tinsmith Radebe.
Gaunt and with the scarred face of a ﬁghter, forty-ﬁve-year-old Zikhode was one of a
loosely afﬁliated group of mechanics who repaired and serviced vehicles (primarily taxi
minibuses) alongside a Khayelitsha taxi rank. Although they shared some tools, they
effectively worked as individual contractors and were hired by the taxi drivers or owners.
Earnings were highly variable, and they extended little credit. Zikhode, like the others,
had no form of collective savings or insurance. He was entirely self-taught. Although
resident with his parents in 2007, Zikhode made a limited and clearly delineated
contribution to the household economy, but he refused to assume responsibility for his
younger siblings. With low living costs and uncomplicated domestic arrangements, he
appeared to be making enough money to engage in discretionary expenditure on daily
hot lunches and alcohol.
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By 2009 he was imprisoned and awaiting trial on hijacking/theft charges (accounts
were contradictory), but insisted on his innocence and ascribed his arrest to a case of
mistaken identity. Released from prison in late 2009 (possibly on bail, or with the
dismissal of the case: accounts were contradictory), regular meals and enforced
abstinence from alcohol saw a radiant-looking Zikhode return to work at the taxi
rank. His enthusiasm was marred, however, by his sense that ‘jealous’ (envious)
neighbours had had some hand in his recent incarceration, and by his concern at the
advent of a new generation of larger, more technologically complex and dealership-
serviced taxis. The government’s taxi recapitalization programme had introduced these
new Japanese-sourced minibus taxis, and he was precluded from repairing them. Not
only is accredited maintenance a condition of the manufacturer’s warranty and service
plan, but repairing the technologically advanced vehicles requires complex electronic
diagnostic equipment and specialist skills. He possessed neither, and worried about this
threat to his livelihood.
In this example the exclusionary potential of formality inheres in a combination
of both regulatory change and technological ‘lock out’. Zikhode viewed himself as
a skilled mechanic and wished to obtain training, primarily for the certiﬁcation
it would confer. He reasoned, perhaps with justiﬁcation, that this formal
endorsement of his skills would enable him to secure a formal sector job, and
thereby exit the informal sector. The promise of training was not that it would
enable Zikhode progressively to formalize, upscale or grow his informal economic
activity, but rather that he would be able to abandon this sector and social
network altogether. Zikhode’s was a common aspiration in a context such
as contemporary South Africa where the formal sector predominates, and
informality represents a poor substitute. The case of tinsmith Radebe similarly
reﬂects the ambivalent consequences of formality.
Radebe lived by himself in Khayelitsha and supported a wife and family resident in the
rural Eastern Cape through the pension he received and his work as a tinsmith.
Manually, using hand tools, he fabricated items from tinplate, which were sold via
employees at several sites. Although basic and utilitarian in design, his wares were
extremely well-made and included specialized products such as large goat-sized cooking
pots adapted from 44-gallon drums, and a range of utensils and strainers used for
brewing traditional sorghum beer. Despite his relatively lucrative and skilled niche
enterprise, which allowed him routinely to remit to his family in the Eastern Cape his
entire unspent state pension, Radebe faced a number of constraints. The ﬁrst was the loss
of his workshop space. During the redevelopment of the township he was randomly
selected to be relocated, as part of ‘de-densiﬁcation’ of the shacks, and his newly
allocated concrete block house was not only distant from viable vending points but
surrounded by similarly relocated strangers. These new neighbours were far less tolerant
of the noisy hammering from his home workshop, which they complained was an affront
to their respectable new suburban homes. He solved this problem by building a
rudimentary shelter alongside a busy arterial route from which to work and vend, but the
structure was soon demolished by the municipal authority. By 2009 he had built an even
more rudimentary structure (of scrap wood, plastic sheeting and cardboard) elsewhere.
The second constraint was Radebe’s difﬁculty in sourcing the printed or painted metal
(tin, zinc and aluminum) sheeting he required. In the past, intermediaries associated with
a local development project had helped him source this material. However by 2007 the
scrap tinplate he coveted was increasingly scarce, amidst the efﬁciencies of industrial
automation and formal tendering out of scrap metal collection by local can-making
companies. The difﬁculty of engaging with these sources was exacerbated by Radebe’s
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lack of English or Afrikaans language skills, literacy and social conﬁdence. A third
constraint was his relationships with the three elderly women he employed to sell his
wares, which seemed fraught with mistrust. He alleged on several occasions that they
were swindling him.
Radebe’s case demonstrates the workings and results of formality. Prevailing
state models for the provision of housing infrastructure privilege formalization,
and for many years the informal settlement areas of Khayelitsha have been
subject to redevelopment efforts. The upgrading of informal shacks through their
replacement by serviced low-cost housing entails the building of infrastructure
and allocation of title deeds. Although keenly desired by residents, and
doubtlessly an improvement in their general living conditions, this formalization
has disadvantages. Despite the intuitive appeal of formalizing property rights,
some argue that it may not increase tenure security (particularly of vulnerable
groups); that it often does not provide an asset that can be used to access credit;
and that formal systems frequently ignore or swiftly become out of step with
extra-legal realities (Cousins et al. 2005). Furthermore, Radebe’s case illustrates
the manner in which the upgrading of informal settlement disrupted long-
established social networks and informal livelihood opportunities. Echoing some
of Zikhode’s experience, Radebe’s artisanal work space and vending sites became
compromised and lost through processes of formalization.
The case of Radebe also demonstrates the process of exclusion from a previous
supply chain of material by technological change. His former suppliers auto-
mated their processes, thereby generating less scrap metal, and formalized
their waste recovery by contracting an industrial recycler. This exclusion was
also driven by concerns about branding and intellectual property, as the scrap
tinplate from the canning industry was printed with the brand names which
the manufacturers now scrupulously controlled. (A canning company employee
explained that they did not want to sully their ‘brand equity’ by having it ‘turned
into township stuff’). Radebe’s exclusion was therefore driven by the fourfold
shifts in the spatial, technological, industrial and intellectual property regimes
around him. Not only is formality often piecemeal (Guyer 2004), and intertwined
with informality in complex and hybrid ways, but it clearly occurs across a
multitude of possible domains.
The consequences of formality for those in the informal sector are not
uniformly adverse, however. They are dependent on the speciﬁcity of the
structural and social positions people occupy, and whether they are able to
position themselves to beneﬁt from change. Some ﬁnd ways to proﬁt in the
‘creative destruction’ associated with new regimes of formality and market
relations.
CONCLUSION
This article has analysed small-scale survivalist economic activity at the margins
of the South African economy, and examined the often complex social dynamics
and imperatives that underpin it. The case study material presented suggests how
much social skill and adeptness is required to eke out a viable livelihood from the
small arenas of economic opportunity contained in the informal sector, in
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addition to technical skills and key positional factors. To those in the informal
sector, social considerations shape and inform the diverse objectives of their
activities. Economic activity is neither understood, nor is its viability judged,
simply in relation to the maximization of proﬁt. Instead enterprises are viewed in
terms of the extent to which they balance up the multiple objectives of securing
resource ﬂows (ﬁscal and otherwise), making investments (material and social)
and mitigating risk. These diverse enterprise objectives, the varied strategies of
small-scale accumulation they embody, and the manifold social identities with
which they are entangled, reveal much about patterns of economic development
at the margins. Varied, variegated and non-linear, these trajectories of economic
development serve to challenge the assumption that the economy becomes
progressively disconnected from society as it becomes more formal.
The article also highlights the centrality, to those in the informal sector, of
managing socially redistributive claims and practices within their broader social
networks. The demands of managing social claims were evident in relation
to a number of domains, including negotiating those practices of economic
governance – both formal (state-led) and informal –which provide the conditions
of possibility for economic activities. Finally, the article examines the encroaching
processes of formalization, describing their often ambivalent effects on those on
the economic margins. Those in the informal sector typically seek to negotiate the
consequences of these, and simultaneously carefully position themselves to
harness the beneﬁts of formalization, while evading its considerable constraints.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The support of Deborah James is gratefully acknowledged. This work was partly funded by
a grant from the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK (award RES-062-23-
1290), which we gratefully acknowledge. Opinions expressed are our own.
REFERENCES
Andrews, M. and R. C. Fox (2004) ‘Undercultivation and intensiﬁcation in the
Transkei: a case study of historical changes in the use of arable land in Nompa,
Shixini’, Development Southern Africa 21 (4): 687–706.
Bähre, E. (2007)Money and Violence: ﬁnancial self-help groups in a South African
township. Leiden, Brill.
Bank, L. (1997) ‘Of livestock and deadstock: entrepreneurship and tradition on
the South African highveld’ in D. F. Bryceson and V. Jamal (eds), Farewell to
Farms: de-agrarianisation and employment in Africa. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Bayart, J.-F. (1993) The State in Africa: the politics of the belly. London:
Longman.
Bayart, J.-F., S. Ellis and B. Hibou (eds) (1999) The Criminalisation of the State in
Africa. Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press.
Beckert, J. (2007) ‘The social order of markets’, Discussion Paper 07/15, Max
Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne.
Beuving, J. J. (2004) ‘Cotonou’s Klondike: African traders and second-hand car
markets in Benin’, Journal of Modern African Studies 42 (4): 511–37.
145MONEY, SOCIALITY, AND THE INFORMAL ECONOMY
Bloch, M. and J. Parry (1989) ‘Introduction: money and the morality of
exchange’ in J. Parry andM. Bloch (eds),Money and the Morality of Exchange.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bracking, S. and L. Sachikonye (2006) ‘Remittances, poverty reduction and
the informalization of household wellbeing in Zimbabwe’, Global Poverty
Research Group Working Paper Series, GPRG-WPS-045, <http://www.gprg.
org/pubs/workingpapers/default.htm>, accessed 11 November 2007.
Bryceson, D. F. and V. Jamal (eds) (1997) Farewell to Farms: de-agrarianisation
and employment in Africa. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Chen, A. M. (2007) ‘Rethinking the informal economy: linkages with the formal
economy and the formal regulatory environment’, DESA Working Paper
No. 46, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
New York.
Cichello, P. (2005) ‘Hindrances to self-employment: evidence from the 2000
Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain Survey’, Working Paper 101, Centre for Social
Science Research, University of Cape Town.
Cichello, P., G. S. Fields and M. Leibbrandt (2005) ‘Earnings and employment
dynamics for Africans in post-apartheid South Africa: a panel study of
KwaZulu-Natal’, Journal of African Economies 14 (2): 143–90.
Collins, D. (2005) ‘Financial instruments of the poor: initial ﬁndings from the
South African Financial Diaries study’, Development Southern Africa 22 (5):
717–28.
Collins, D., J. Morduch, S. Rutherford and O. Ruthven (2009) Portfolios of the
Poor: how the world’s poor live on $2 a day. Princeton NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Cousins, B., T. Cousins, D. Hornby, R. Kingwill, L. Royston and W. Smit (2005)
‘Will formalising property rights reduce poverty in South Africa’s “second
economy”?’, Policy Brief 18, Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies,
University of the Western Cape.
Davis, M. (2006) Planet of Slums. London: Verso.
de Soto, H. (2000) The Mystery of Capital. London: Bantam.
Devey, R., I. Valodia and C. Skinner (2006) ‘Second best? trends and linkages
in the informal economy in South Africa’, DPRU Working Paper 06/102,
Development Policy Research Unit, University of Cape Town.
Dugard, J. (2000) ‘Taxi Wars in South Africa’s Transition: the informalisation
of violence and the economy’. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of
Cambridge.
du Toit, A. and D. Neves (2007) ‘Understanding self-employment at the margins
of the South African economy: ﬁndings from a pilot study on qualitative
approaches to self-employment’. Report by the Institute for Poverty, Land and
Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) for the National Income Dynamics Study Steering
Committee, Ofﬁce of the Presidency, Cape Town.
Ferguson, J. (1992) ‘The cultural topography of wealth: commodity paths and the
structure of property in rural Lesotho’, American Anthropologist 94 (1): 55–73.
——– (1999) Expectations of Modernity: myths and meanings of urban life on the
Zambian copperbelt. Berkeley CA: University of California Press.
Foxcroft, M., E. Wood, J. Kew, M. Herrington and M. Segal (2002) ‘Global
entrepreneurship monitor: South African executive report’, Graduate School of
Business, University of Cape Town.
146 DAVID NEVES AND ANDRIES DU TOIT
Fukuyama, F. (1995) ‘Social capital and the global economy’, Foreign Affairs
74 (5): 89–103.
Granovetter, M. (1985) ‘Economic action and social structure: the problem of
embeddedness’, American Journal of Sociology 91 (3): 481–510.
——– (2005) ‘The impact of social structure on economic outcomes’, Journal of
Economic Perspectives 19 (1): 33–50.
Granovetter, M. and R. Swedberg (2001) The Sociology of Economic Life.
Boulder CO: Westview Press.
Guyer, J. I. (2004) Marginal Gains: monetary transactions in Atlantic Africa.
Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press.
Hart, K. (1973) ‘Informal income opportunities and urban employment in
Ghana’, Journal of Modern African Studies 11 (1): 61–89.
Humphrey, C. (2002) The Unmaking of Soviet life: everyday economies after
socialism. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.
Kloosterman, R., J. van der Leun and J. Rath (1999) ‘Mixed embeddedness:
(in)formal economic activities and immigrant businesses in the
Netherlands’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 23 (2):
252–66.
KLS/CCT (2009) ‘An audit of spaza shops in Khayelitsha, Cape Town’.
Research report by Knowledge Cape Town: Link Services and the City of
Cape Town.
Lund, F. and F. Skinner (2003) ‘Integrating the informal economy in urban
planning and governance: a case study of the process of policy development
in Durban, South Africa’, International Development Planning Review 26 (4):
431–56.
Maas, G. and M. Herrington (2006) ‘Global Entrepreneurship Monitor: South
African executive report 2006’, Centre for Innovation and Entrepreneurship,
University of Cape Town.
Mamdani, M. (1996) Citizen and Subject: contemporary Africa and the legacy of
late colonialism. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Meagher, K. (2009) ‘Culture, agency and power: theoretical reﬂections on
informal economic networks and political processes’, DIIS Working Paper 27,
Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen.
——– (2010) Identity Economics: social networks and the informal economy in
Nigeria. Woodbridge: James Currey.
Neves, D., M. Samson, I. van Niekerk, S. Hlatshwayo and T. du Toit (2009)
‘The use and effectiveness of social grants in South Africa’. Research report,
FinMark Trust, Johannesburg.
Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2002) ‘Domestication, agency and subjectivity in the
Cameroonian Grassﬁelds’ in R. Werbner (ed.), Postcolonial Subjectivities in
Africa. London: Zed Books.
Petersen, L. and A. Charman (2008) ‘Making markets work for the
poor – understanding the informal economy in Limpopo’. Report for the
Limpopo Centre for Local Economic Development, commissioned by
Sustainable Livelihood Consultants and Cardno Agrisystems, Cape Town.
Philip, K. (2009) ‘Second economy strategy: addressing inequality and economic
marginalisation: a strategy framework’. Strategy paper for Trade and
Industrial Policy Strategies, Pretoria.
Polanyi, K. (1957) The Great Transformation. Boston MA: Beacon Press.
147MONEY, SOCIALITY, AND THE INFORMAL ECONOMY
Republic of South Africa (RSA) (2003) Government Gazette 461 (26),
November. Cape Town: Government Printer, <http://www.info.gov.za/view/
DownloadFileAction?id=68002>, accessed 3 June 2010.
Rogerson, C. M. (2007) ‘“Second economy” versus informal economy: a South
African affair’ Editorial, Geoforum 38 (6): 1053–7.
Roitman, J. (2003) ‘Unsanctioned wealth, or the productivity of debt in northern
Cameroon’, Public Culture 15 (2): 211–37.
——– (2005) Fiscal Disobedience: an anthropology of economic regulation in
Central Africa. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Seekings, J. and N. Nattrass (2005) Class, Race and Inequality in South Africa.
New Haven CT: Yale University Press.
Skinner, C. (2006) ‘Securing livelihoods: a gendered analysis of support
interventions available to street traders in the Durban metropolitian area’,
Research Report No. 34, Centre for Social and Development Studies (CSDS),
University of KwaZulu-Natal.
Spiegel, A. (1996) ‘Introduction: domestic ﬂuidity in South Africa’, Social
Dynamics 22 (1): 5–6.
van Donge, K. J. (1992) ‘Waluguru traders in Dar es Salaam: an analysis of the
social construction of economic life’, African Affairs 91 (363): 181–205.
von Broembsen, M. (2008) ‘SMMEs, the informal sector and the “second
economy”’, PLAAS Working Paper 10, Institute for Poverty, Land and
Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape.
Western Cape Provincial Government (2005) ‘Committee of inquiry into the
underlying causes of instability and conﬂict in the minibus taxi industry in the
Cape Town metropolitan area’. Report, Western Cape Provincial Government,
Cape Town.
Wolpe, H. (1972) ‘Capitalism and cheap labour power in South Africa: from
segregation to apartheid’, Economy and Society 1 (4): 425–56.
ABSTRACT
This article examines the interplay of agency, culture and context in order to
consider the social embeddedness of money and trade at the margins of South
Africa’s economy. Focusing on small-scale, survivalist informal enterprise
operators, it draws on socio-cultural analysis to explore the social dynamics
involved in generating and managing wealth. After describing the informal sector
in South Africa, the article elucidates the relationship between money and
economic informality. First, diverse objectives, typically irreducible to the
maximization of proﬁt, animate those in the informal sector and challenge
meta-narratives of a ‘great transformation’ towards socially disembedded and
depersonalized economic relationships. Second, regimes of economic governance,
both state-led and informal, shape the terrain on which informal economic
activity occurs in complex and constitutive ways. Third, local idioms and
practices of trading, managing money and negotiating social claims similarly
conﬁgure economic activities. Fourth, and ﬁnally, encroaching and often
inexorable processes of formalization differentially inﬂuence those in the informal
sector. The analysis draws on these ﬁndings to recapitulate both the ubiquity and
centrality of the sociality at the heart of economy, and to examine the particular
forms they take in South Africa’s informal economy.
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RÉSUMÉ
Cet article examine l’interaction de la culture, de l’action et du contexte pour
étudier l’enchâssement social de l’argent et du commerce à la marge de l’économie
sud-africaine. À travers le cas des entrepreneurs informels menant des activités de
survie à petite échelle, il explore à partir d’une analyse socioculturelle la
dynamique sociale qui intervient dans la génération et la gestion de patrimoine.
Après avoir décrit le secteur informel en Afrique du Sud, l’article explique la
relation entre l’argent et l’informalité économique. Premièrement, des objectifs
divers, qui ne peuvent généralement pas se réduire à la maximisation du proﬁt,
animent les acteurs du secteur informel et remettent en question les métarécits
d’une « grande transformation » vers des relations économiques socialement
désenchâssées et personnalisées. Deuxièmement, des régimes de gouvernance
économique (dirigés par l’État et informels) façonnent le terrain sur lequel
survient l’activité économique informelle de manière complexe et constitutive
multiple. Troisièmement, les idiomes locaux et les pratiques de commerce, de
gestion d’argent et de négociation des revendications sociales conﬁgurent de la
même façon les activités économiques. Enﬁn quatrièmement, des processus de
formalisation envahissants et souvent inexorables inﬂuencent différentiellement
ceux du secteur informel. L’analyse s’appuie sur ces conclusions pour récapituler
à la fois l’ubiquité et la centralité de la socialité au cœur de l’économie, et pour
examiner les formes particulières qu’elles prennent dans l’économie informelle en
Afrique du Sud.
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